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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY HORTON, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellant ) 
V. , 
THE ROYAL ORDER OF THE SUN, j 
a Utah non-profit corporation ; 
and STUDEBAKER'S, a Utah non- ] 
profit corporation, ] 
Defendants/Appellees ) 
> Case No. 880490 
> Priority: 14(b) 
) THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
) Case No. C 87-7579 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE THE ROYAL ORDER OF THE SUN 
JURISDICTION STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over 
this case pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Ann. 
(1988), "orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record 
over which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction." 
NATURE QF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the Order of Dismissal with 
Prejudice and upon the Merits entered November 16, 1988 in the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County dismissing Appellant 
Horton's action against Appellees Studebaker's and the Royal 
Order of the Sun ("Sun") for injuries Horton suffered as the 
result of Horton's voluntary intoxication. 
STATEMENT QF THE ISSUES 
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether an 
intoxicated adult has a cause of action against a provider of 
alcohol for injuries the intoxicated adult suffers as the result 
of the intoxicated adult's voluntary intoxication. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following Rules and statutes, cited in this Brief, 
are determinative of the issue on appeal: 
Rule 12(b)(6), U.R.C.P. 
Section 32A-12-9, U.C.A. (as amended effective March 
17, 1986) 
Section 32A-12-13.3 (1986) 
Section 32A-14-1 (as amended effective March 17, 1986) 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an action for personal injuries brought by a 
voluntarily intoxicated adult against providers of alcoholic 
beverages. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On November 19, 1987, Plaintiff/Appellant Larry Horton 
("Horton") filed a complaint against providers of alcoholic 
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beverages, Defendants/Appellees, Studebaker's and The Royal Order 
of The Sun ("Sun"), for personal injuries Horton suffered while 
voluntarily intoxicated. (R. 02-06) 
The Sun filed an Answer and Counterclaim. (R. 07-08) 
Horton filed a Reply to the Sun's Counterclaim. (R. 09) 
On October 13, 1988, Studebaker's filed a Motion to 
Dismiss Horton's action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), U.R.C.P., 
asserting that an intoxicated person has no common law or 
statutory claim against a dramshop for injuries caused by his 
intoxication. The Sun joined in Studebaker's Motion to Dismiss. 
(R. 11-26) 
On November 7, 1988, the Motions to Dismiss came on for 
hearing. (R. 37, 47) 
On November 16, 1988, the district court entered its 
Order of Dismissal with Prejudice and upon the Merits dismissing 
Horton's complaint. (R. 38-39) On December 14, 1988, Horton 
filed his Notice of Appeal. (R. 42) 
C. Disposition in the Lower Court 
Pursuant to Minute Entry dated November 7, 1988, the 
district court, by Order entered November 16, 1988, dismissed 
Horton's Complaint with prejudice and upon the merits. (R. 38-
39) 
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EL Statement of Relevant Facts 
For the purpose of appellate review only, the following 
facts may be assumed to be true: 
1. The Sun and Studebaker's are each non-profit 
corporations located in Salt Lake County, Utah. (R. 02, 1) 
2. On May 21, 1987, Horton, as a patron, consumed 
numerous alcoholic beverages at Studebaker's. (R„ 02, 2) 
3. Horton became extremely intoxicated. (R. 02, 3) 
4. Studebaker's employees continued to serve Horton, 
despite his extreme and obvious intoxication. (R. 02, 4) 
5. Horton left Studebaker's and went to the Sun. (R. 
02, 5) 
6. The employees of the Sun continued to serve Horton 
alcoholic beverages despite his obvious and extreme intoxication. 
(R. 02, 6) 
7. Horton passed out and fell, striking his head. 
(R. 02, 7) 
8. Horton is permanently disabled, has incurred 
substantial medical expenses, and has suffered a loss of income 
and mental anguish. (R. 02, s 8, 9, 10 and 11) 
SUMMARY QF THE ARGUMENT 
Even if the factual assertions in Horton's Complaint 
were correct, which Studebaker's and the Sun admit only for 
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purposes of this appeal, those assertions provided no legal basis 
for recovery. In Utah, there is no statutory or common-law cause 
of action against a dram shop by an adult injured as a result of 
his own voluntary intoxication. 
The Utah Dram Shop Act, which is contrary to the common 
law, provides a cause of action against a dram shop "for injuries 
in person, property, or means of support to any third person, or 
to the spouse, child, or parent of that third person, resulting 
from the intoxication of another person caused by the dram shop. 
The Utah Dram Shop Act has been amended three times since its 
enactment in 1985. However, the legislature has never seen fit 
to provide a cause of action to an adult injured as a result of 
his voluntary intoxication, despite a pointed observation by this 
Court in a 1986 case. 
Horton does not come within the class of persons sought 
to be protected under Title 32A, chapter 12 of the Utah Code, 
which provides for criminal enforcement of Utah's liquor laws. 
Furthermore, those criminal provisions were not directed toward 
preventing the type of harm Horton suffered as the result of the 
"state of extreme intoxication" he "achieved." 
This Court should affirm the lower court's Order of 
Dismissal with Prejudice and on the merits. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
HORTON'S COMPLAINT WAS LEGALLY 
INSUFFICIENT TO STATE ANY CAUSE OF 
ACTION AGAINST STUDEBAKER'S AND THE 
SUN. 
Rule 12(b)(6) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim 
for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim, shall be asserted in the responsive 
pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option 
of the pleader be made by motion: . . . (6) 
failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, . . . 
In LQRQ v, Sorenson Research CQ,» Inc., 779 P. 2d 668, 
669 (Utah 1989), this Court set forth the standard of review in 
an appeal from the grant of a motion to dismiss under Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Justice Zimmerman wrote: 
Because this is an appeal from the grant 
of a motion to dismiss under Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we will review only 
the facts alleged in the complaint. In 
determining whether the trial court properly 
granted the motion, we accept the factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and 
consider them and all reasonable inferences 
to be drawn therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff. E.G.. Arrow 
Indus, Inc. y, Zions First Hat'l Bank, 767 
P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988); Penrod v. Nu 
Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 
1983). We will affirm the dismissal only if 
it is apparent that as a matter of law, the 
plaintiff could not recover under the facts 
alleged. See Arrow Indus. , Inc. v. Z-ions. 
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Eixsi Hat* 1 Bank, 767 P.2d at 936; Barrus v. 
Wilkinson. 16 Utah 2d 204, 205, 398 P.2d 207, 
208 (1965); Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
Because we are considering only the legal 
sufficiency of the complaint, we give the 
trial court's ruling no deference and review 
it under a correctness standard. See Atlas 
Corp. v. Clovis Nat*1 Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 
(Utah 1987); Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 
714, 716 (Utah 1985). 
See also, folding v. Ashley Cent, Irr. Co,, 793 P.2d 897, 898 
(Utah 1990); Heiner v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co.. 790 P.2d 107, 
109-110 (Utah App. 1990); and Mounteer v, Utah Power & Light Co,, 
773 P.2d 405, 406 (Utah App. 1989). 
The following facts are alleged in the complaint: On 
May 21, 1987, Horton was a patron at Studebaker's. Horton 
consumed numerous alcoholic beverages there and became extremely 
intoxicated. Studebaker's employees continued to serve Horton, 
despite his extreme and obvious intoxication. 
Horton then left Studebaker's and went to the Sun. The 
Sun's employees continued to serve Horton alcoholic beverages 
despite his obvious and extreme intoxication. While at the Sun, 
Horton passed out and fell, striking his head. 
Horton is permanently disabled, has incurred 
substantial medical expenses, and has suffered a loss of income 
and mental anguish. 
According to Horton's own allegations, he was injured 
when he fell as the result of the "state of extreme intoxication" 
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he "achieved." Horton alleged no facts supporting an inference 
that he suffered injury at the hands of any patron, employee or 
agent of Studebaker's or the Sun. Horton did not allege that 
Studebaker's or the Sun caused the "state of extreme 
intoxication" he "achieved." 
Proof of causation of intoxication is a prerequisite to 
recovery under the dramshop act. 64 A.L.R.3d Proof of Causation 
of Intoxication As A Prerequisite To Recovery Under Civil Damage 
A d 882. Section 32A-14-1, Utah Code Ann. (1986) provided in 
pertinent part: 
(1) Any person who directly gives, 
sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or at a 
location allowing consumption on the 
premises, any alcoholic beverage, to a 
person: 
(a) who is under the age of 
21 years or 
(b) who is apparently under 
the influence of intoxicating 
alcoholic beverages or products or 
drugs or 
(c) whom the person 
furnishing the alcoholic beverage 
knew or should have known from the 
circumstances was under the 
influence of intoxicating alcoholic 
beverages or products or drugs or 
(d) who is a known 
interdicted person, 
and by those actions causes the intoxication 
of that person, is liable for injuries in 
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person, property, or means of support to any 
third person, or to the spouse, child, or 
parent of that third person, resulting from 
the intoxication. An employer is liable for 
the actions of its employees in violation of 
this chapter. 
(2) A person who suffers an injury 
under Subsection (1) has a cause of action 
against the person who provided the liquor or 
other alcoholic beverage in violation of 
Subsection (1). 
The allegations in Morton's Complaint were legally 
insufficient under this statute and under the common law to state 
a cause of action against either Studebaker's or the Sun or both. 
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege facts 
that add up to a claim. Horton's complaint failed. The district 
court correctly concluded as a matter of law that Horton failed 
to state a claim against Studebaker's and the Sun. 
POINT II, 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, A VOLUNTARILY 
INTOXICATED ADULT HAS NO CAUSE OF 
ACTION AGAINST A DRAMSHOP 
FURNISHING ANY ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE. 
A. The Utah Legislature Has Created No Statutory Remedy Altering 
The Common Law Rule That Qne Injured As The Result Qf His Qwn 
Voluntary Intoxication Has No Cause Qf Action Against A Provider 
Qf Alcohol. 
At common law it is not a tort to either sell or give 
intoxicating liquor to ordinary able-bodied men, and it has been 
frequently held that in the absence of statute, there can be no 
cause of action against one furnishing liquor in favor of those 
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injured by the intoxication of the person so furnished. The 
reason usually given for this rule is that the drinking of the 
liquor, not the furnishing of it, is the proximate cause of the 
injury. The rule is based on the obvious fact that one cannot 
become intoxicated by reason of liquor furnished him if he does 
not drink it. 45 Am. Jur. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 553, pp. 
852-853. 
To supply the defect of the common law, which affords 
practically nothing in the way of remedies for injury or damage 
caused by intoxication, the legislatures of many states have 
enacted statutes giving, generally, a right of action to persons 
injured in person, property, or means of support, by an 
intoxicated person, or in consequence of the intoxication of any 
person, against the person selling or furnishing the liquor which 
caused the intoxication, in whole or in part. These statutes, 
commonly known as "civil damage acts" or "dramshop acts," afford 
renedies unknown to the connon law. The remedies created by the 
statutes are not in any sense eonmon-law negligence actions. 
New, separate, and distinct rights of action are conferred. 
Ibid,, § 561, p. 859. 
One thing that must be constantly borne in mind when 
considering such acts is that the right and remedy created by 
them are exclusive; no right of action exists except as expressly 
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given by the statutes, and the remedy prescribed cannot be 
enlarged except by further legislative enactnent. Id. 
There is authority to the effect that the purchaser is 
not within the contemplation of a statute giving a remedy to 
every spouse, child, parent, "or other person." Moreover, in an 
analogy to the doctrine of contributory negligence, it has been 
generally held that the liquor furnisher is not liable to a 
plaintiff who himself contributed to the intoxication in 
consequence of which he received injuries. Ibid. . § 580, p. 871. 
The Utah Legislature first imposed statutory liability 
on liquor providers in the Utah Dram Shop act of 1981 ("1981 
Act"). The legislature amended the Act in 1985 and again in 
1986. The Act applies to vendors and apparently also to social 
hosts serving intoxicating beverages to guests. 
The 1981 Act, Utah Code Ann. § 32-11-1 (Supp. 1981) 
(repealed 1985), provided in pertinent part: 
(1) Any person who gives, 
sells, or otherwise provides intoxicating 
liquor to another contrary to subsection 16-
6-13.1(8)(d), subsection 32-1-36.5(1)(1), 
section 32-7-14, or subsection 32-7-24(b) or 
(c), and thereby causes the intoxication of 
the other person, is liable for injuries in 
person, property, or means of support to any 
third person, or the spouse, child, or parent 
of that third person, resulting from the 
intoxication. 
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(2) A person who suffers an injury 
referred to in subsection (1) of this 
section, shall have a cause of action against 
the intoxicated person and the person who 
provided the intoxicating liquor in violation 
of subsection (1) above, or either of them. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-13.1(8)(d) (Supp. 1983) (repealed 
1985) prohibited social clubs with state liquor stores on the 
premises from selling liquor or wine to minors, persons actually, 
apparently, or obviously drunk, any known habitual drunkards, and 
any known interdicted persons. Utah Code Ann. § 32-1-36.5(1)(1) 
(Supp. 1969) (repealed 1985) prohibited restaurants with state 
liquor stores on their premises from selling liquor or wine to 
minors, persons actually, apparently, or obviously drunk, any 
known habitual drunkards, and any known interdicted persons. 
Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-14 (1974) (repealed 1985) forbade the sale 
or supply of alcoholic beverages to persons under or apparently 
under the influence of liquor. Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-24 (1974) 
(repealed 1985) prohibited (b) the consumption of liquor by a 
person apparently under the influence of liquor on the premises 
of an owner, tenant, or occupant and (c) the giving of liquor to 
a person apparently under the influence of liquor. See also 
Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806 (Utah 
1988) . 
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The 1986 Amendments to the Utah Dram Shop Act 
("Amendments") substantially altered the liability imposed on 
providers of intoxicating beverages. The 1986 Amendments 
rectified several problems that existed with the prior version of 
the Act. The significant changes include (1) a narrower 
definition of the specific conduct on which liability may be 
based, (2) a limitation on the amount of damages available under 
the Dram Shop cause of action, and (3) an extension of liability 
to certain providers of beer. Utah Dram Shop Act Amendments, 
1987 Utah L. Rev. 304-305. 
At common law, a person suffering injury as a 
consequence of another's intoxication had little remedy against 
the provider of the intoxicating beverage. The common law viewed 
the actual consumption of the beverage, not the provision of the 
beverage, as the proximate cause of a person's intoxication and 
any injury resulting from that intoxication. Because the 
provision of the beverage could not be the proximate cause of 
another person's intoxication, providers of intoxicating 
beverages owed no duty of care to the public at large or to the 
actual consumer of the beverage. Ibid. . 305. 
Dram Shop acts are contrary to the common law and 
impose a statutory duty on providers of intoxicating beverages by 
holding them liable for the consequences of the consumer's 
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intoxication. The acts generally provide a remedy against the 
provider for personal injury or damage to property interests 
resulting from the conduct of an intoxicated consumer or 
otherwise resulting from the intoxication. Ibid.. 306. 
The 1986 Amendments specifically address each of the 
problems discussed above. The Amendments largely eliminate the 
potential problem of liability without causation by narrowly 
defining the conduct on which Dram Shop liability may be based. 
The specific acts that trigger Dram Shop liability are now 
expressly defined in the Act without reference to ninor 
regulatory provisions appearing elsewhere in the Code. Dram Shop 
liability is now imposed on any person who provides liquor to 
anyone (1) under twenty-one years of age, (2) apparently under 
the influence of intoxicants, (3) whom the server knew or should 
have known from the circumstances was intoxicated, or (4) who is 
a known interdicted person. Ibid.. 307-308. 
The fact that § 32A-14-1, Utah Code Ann. (1986), 
continued the 1981 Act's purpose to limit dramshop liability to 
third persons only further supports the trial court's 
determination here. Certainly, between the time section 32-11-2 
was enacted in 1981 and its repeal and reenactment as section 
32A-14-2 in 1985, the legislature had considerable time to review 
the effect and import of such language and make any intended 
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modifications. Cf., Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 116 
U.A.R. 23 (Utah 1989). 
The Legislature's purpose to limit dramshop liability 
to third persons only is further illustrated in the 1989 and 1990 
amendments to the Utah Dram Shop Act (Addendum "A"). Those 
amendments continue to limit liability to third persons only, 
despite this Court's pointed observation in Beach v. University 
of Utah. 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986), regarding recovery by the 
intoxicated person from the provider. In footnote 3 in Beach. 
Justice Zimmerman wrote: 
3. There is no claim here that the 
University furnished alcohol to Beach. It is 
uncertain whether such a fact would have made 
any difference in this case. Utah law 
prohibits the furnishing of alcohol to a 
minor. U.C.A., 1953, § 32A-12-8 (1986 ed. ). 
We have held that such a statutory violation 
can be used to prove negligence on the part 
of the vendor in an action brought by one 
injured by the intoxicated minor. Yost v. 
Ulaii, 640 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1981); SJLS. SJJLQ. 
Rees Y, AlbertsorTs, Inc., 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 
1978) (intoxicated minor is entitled to have 
a determination made as to the seller's 
misconduct in providing him with beer in 
action for contribution). Dictum in Yost 
suggests, however, that Utah recognizes no 
common law right of action against a provider 
of alcohol based upon the fact that the 
alcohol was furnished in violation of the 
law. 640 P.2d at 1046. If this dictum is 
accurate, any liability premised directly on 
the illegal furnishing of alcohol would have 
to arise from a statutory provision. The 
Utah Dramshop Act, initially enacted in 1981 
and repealed and reenacted in 1985, provides 
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that one who "gives, sells, or otherwise 
provides liquor" to a person under twenty-
one who becomes intoxicated as a result and 
who injures another because of the 
intoxication is liable to third parties for 
damages. U.C.A., 1953, §32A-14-1 (1986 
ed.); sae. 1981 Utah Laws ch. 152. The 
Dramshop Act allows third parties to recover 
from those improperly providing liquor, but 
does not allow the intoxicated person to 
recover from the provider. Therefore, one 
injured as a result of his or her own 
voluntary but unlawful intoxication would 
appear to be without remedy against the 
provider of the alcohol, either under the 
Dramshop Act or under common law. Cf. Miller 
3L. City of Portland, 288 Or. 271, 279, 604 
P.2d 1261, 1264-65 (1980). 
726 P.2d at 417. 
The principle enunciated earlier in this Brief that the 
remedy provided by a dram shop act cannot be enlarged except by 
further legislative enactment is highlighted by the history of 
Miller v. Citv of Portland. 288 Or. 271, 604 P.2d 1261 (1980), 
cited by Justice Zimmerman in Beach, supra. 
In Miller. also known as Citv of Portland v. Alhadeff. 
the Oregon Supreme Court held, inter alia.: 
This court has never previously 
recognized a common law cause of action in 
favor of a person who suffers injury 
resulting from his or her own consumption of 
alcohol. Nor have most other courts. 
Because it would be contrary to apparent 
legislative policy, we also consider it 
inappropriate to create a common law cause of 
action for physical injury to minors caused 
by their illegal purchase of alcoholic 
liquor. 
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604 P.2d at 1265. 
Before Miller was argued and submitted on October 1, 
1979, the Oregon legislature repealed its original dram shop act 
and replaced it with new legislation effective July 25, 1979. 
The original dram shop act, O.R.S. 30.730, had provided: 
Any person who shall bargain, sell, 
exchange or give to any intoxicated person or 
habitual drunkard spirituous, vinous, malt or 
intoxicating liquors shall be liable for all 
damage resulting in whole or in part 
therefrom, in an action brought by the wife, 
husband, parent or child of such intoxicated 
person or habitual drunkard. The act of any 
agent or employe shall be deemed the act of 
his principal or employer for the purposes of 
this section. 
The replacement legislation, O.R.S. 30.950 provides: 
No licensee or permittee is liable for 
damages incurred or caused by intoxicated 
patrons off the licensee's or permittee's 
business premises unless the licensee or 
permittee has served or provided the patron 
alcoholic beverages when such patron was 
visibly intoxicated. 
In Sager v. McCIenden. 650 P.2d 1002, 1003-1004 (Or. 
App. 1982), a wrongful death action brought by the wife of a man 
who died as the result of a fall while intoxicated, the Oregon 
Court of Appeals held: 
tfe read the italicized language [in 
O.R.S. 30.950] to mean exactly what it says, 
namely, that licensees or permittees are 
liable both for damages "incurred" by 
intoxicated persons as well as damages 
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''caused by" intoxicated persons. The 
dissenting opinion in construing the above 
section appears either to overlook or 
disregard the word "incurred." Furthermore, 
the above analysis is consistent with earlier 
dictum by this court of this same statutory 
language in Johnson v, Paige. 47 Or.App. 
1177, 1180 n. 2, 615 P.2d 1185 (1980), a case 
brought before the 1979 repeal of the Dram 
Shop Act involving a claim by plaintiff for 
injuries due to her own intoxication. In 
Johnson we said: 
MWe note that H.B. 3152, Section 2, 
1979, ORS 30.955, effective July 25, 
1979, provides: 
" 'No private host is 
liable for damages 
incurred or caused by an 
intoxicated social guest 
unless the private host 
has served or provided 
alcoholic beverages to a 
social guest when such 
guest was visibly 
intoxicated.' 
"The provisions of ORS 30.955, 
however, do not apply retroactively 
to the instant cause of action 
which accrued on October 15, 1976. 
This statute reaffirms our 
conclusion that liability is now 
imposed where none previously 
existed." (Emphasis added.) 
In summary, there is absolutely nothing to suggest that 
the Utah Legislature has created a statutory remedy altering the 
common law rule that one injured as the result of his own 
voluntary intoxication has no cause of action against a provider 
of alcohol. The lower court correctly dismissed Horton's 
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Complaint with prejudice and on the merits. This honorable Court 
should affirm the lower court's dismissal. 
B, When Li EmiiLtsd Section 32A-12-9, U.C.A. (1986), Ike. 
Legislature Had No Specific Intent To Provide A Right Qf Action 
Against A Dramshop To An Intoxicated Adult Injured As The Result 
of His Qwn Voluntary Inebriation, 
As a general rule, violation of a standard of safety 
set by a statute or ordinance is prima facie evidence of 
negligence. Hall v. Warren. 632 P.2d 848, 850 (Utah 1981). 
There, Justice Stewart observed in a footnote: 
This Court at an early date held that 
violation of a statute or ordinance whose 
purpose is to protect life, limb or property 
constituted negligence per se. Smith v. Mine 
& Smelter SUPPIY Qo_, 32 Utah 21, 88 P. 683 
(1907). 
But the rule has undergone an evolution. 
Subsequent to Smith. the per se rule was 
modified to apply only in cases involving 
dangerous instrumentalities. White v. 
Shipley. 48 Utah 496, 160 P. 441 (1916). 
Since the case before us does not concern a 
dangerous instrumentality, the prima facie, 
rather than negligence per se rule is 
applicable. 
IdL. CJL., Jorgenson v. Issa, 139 P.2d 80 (Utah App. 1987), a 
vehicular accident case in which negligence per se was discussed. 
However, criminal or regulatory statutes are frequently 
enacted to cover situations in which no connon law right of 
action has ever been established by courts. One of the most 
usual situations concerns injuries incurred by a person who has 
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been given and has used alcohol. The statutes may have express 
provisions for a tort right of action. When such statutes exact, 
courts must, of course, comply. Miller v. City of Portland. 604 
P.2d 1261, 1264-1265 (Or. 1980). 
On the other hand, regulatory and criminal statutes 
most often contain no express provision for a right of action 
and, where courts have established no common law rights under the 
circumstances governed by the statutes, a different kind of 
problem is posed from the negligence per se situation. Id. 
In such cases, courts attempt to determine legislative 
intent as to civil liability from whatever sources are available 
to them; and, if determinable, courts follow that intent. The 
most usual sources of information are the language of the statute 
itself including the title and preamble, as well as the 
legislative history. If these sources fail to disclose 
legislative intent, courts usually come to the conclusion that 
the problem was not contemplated by the legislature and that it 
had no specific intent. In such a state of affairs, courts must 
still make a decision and they then attempt to ascertain how the 
legislature would have dealt with the situation had it considered 
the problem. This is usually done by looking at the policy 
giving birth to the statute and determining whether a civil tort 
action is needed to carry out that policy. Id. 
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Title 32A, Chapter 12 deals with criminal enforcement 
of Utah's liquor laws. Civil tort action is not necessary to 
carry out that policy of criminal enforcement, except such action 
as provided by the Utah Dram Shop Act to third persons. 
There is nothing in Chapter 12 to indicate that the 
Legislature contemplated civil liability of an association or 
corporation that provided alcohol to an intoxicated person who 
injured himself while inebriated. There is nothing in Chapter 12 
to indicate that the legislature had a specific intent to protect 
an intoxicated person from himself. 
To invoke the rule that violation of a statute is prima 
facie evidence of negligence, a party must show (1) the existence 
of the statute or ordinance, (2) that the statute or ordinance 
was intended to protect the class of persons which includes the 
party, (3) that the protection is directed toward the type of 
harm which has in fact occurred as a result of the violation, and 
(4) that the violation of the ordinance or statute as a proximate 
cause of the injury complained of. Hall v. Warren. 632 P.2d at 
850. See alsxi, Knapstad v, Smith's Management Corp., 774 P.2d 1, 
2 (Utah App. 1989). 
In his Brief of Appellant only, Horton shows the 
existence of Section 32A-12-9 (1986). Horton asserts on page 20 
of his Brief of Appellant: 
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Since our state legislature 
enacted Utah Code Ann. section (sic) 32A-12-
9 (1986) concerning the sale or supply of 
alcoholic beverages or products to a drunken 
person, one would assume that there was 
legislative intention to address the issue of 
supplying alcohol to intoxicated persons. 
This then would indicate that this statute, 
not the Dramshop Act, would control the 
instant case and that our legislature has 
recognized the intoxicated party and 
established duties as regards that party. 
This circular reasoning fails to show that requirements (2) and 
(3) have been met, even if they had been alleged in Horton's 
Complaint, which they were not. Furthermore, an adult individual 
who voluntarily consumes intoxicants and then, by reason of his 
inebriated condition, injures himself is excluded from the class 
protected by a statute prohibiting the sale of alcoholic 
beverages to a visibly intoxicated person. Cuevas v. Roval 
D'lherville Hotel. 498 So.2d 346 (Miss. 1986). 
Horton fails to allege in his Complaint the criminal 
violation of Section 32A-12-9 (1986) by either Studebaker's or 
the Sun. Horton fails to allege that any such violation was a 
proximate cause of his alleged injuries. 
Section 32A-12-13.3, Utah Code Ann. (1986) provides: 
No person may purchase any alcoholic 
beverage or product when he is under the 
influence of intoxicating alcoholic 
beverages, products, or drugs. 
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According to Horton's intoxicating reasoning, from the existence 
of this criminal statute one could assume that the legislature 
has recognized the intoxicated party's right to sue himself for 
violating his established duties to himself. Such a conclusion 
is as ludicrous as Horton's conclusion that criminal Section 32A-
12-9 (1986) gives him a cause of action against a dramshop for 
injuries he suffered as the result of the "state of extreme 
intoxication" he "achieved." 
The lower court correctly determined that Horton's 
Complaint stated no statutory or common-law cause of action 
against Studebaker's or the Sun for the alleged injuries Horton 
suffered as the result of his own voluntary intoxication. This 
Court should affirm the lower court's Order of Dismissal with 
Prejudice and on the Merits. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah legislature's decision to preclude recovery by 
the intoxicated is certainly supported by strong public policy: 
A rule of liability here could have no other 
possible effect upon patrons than to 
encourage them to excessive liquor 
consumption at taverns. Forthwith upon the 
announcement of a rule of law which permits a 
drunken patron to recover damages for his own 
injuries from the tavern keeper, patrons who 
have heretofore felt concern for their own 
safety should they become overly intoxicated 
will relax their personal efforts, for three 
readily apparent reasons. First, because 
they will assume that the bartenders will 
23 
exercise greater care on their behalf; 
second, because they very naturally will feel 
that if they are hurt they will be 
compensated for such hurt; and third, because 
we . . . will in effect have encouraged their 
over indulgence, by pampering their 
delinquency. It cannot be otherwise. The 
already tragic statistics which so horribly 
describe the slaughter of innocent persons by 
drunk drivers will immediately increase, to 
society's further disadvantage. 
Tovar v. Lee. Civil No. 84-1540 at 4-5 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting 
Kindt v, Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603, 611-
12 (1976)). 
Horton states no facts in his Complaint setting forth a 
claim under either the Utah Dram Shop Act or the common law. 
Horton was injured as a result of the "State of extreme 
intoxication" he "achieved." 
If the Legislature sees fit to encourage alcoholic 
overindulgence by rewarding the foolishly intoxicated with a 
cause of action against dram shops for injuries sustained as a 
result of voluntary inebriation, that is the Legislature's 
business. Until and unless that happens, this Court must hold 
that in Utah there is no cause of action against a dram shop for 
injuries suffered as a result of an adult's own voluntary 
intoxication. 
This Court should affirm the lower court's Order of 
Dismissal with Prejudice and on the merits. 
24 
DATED this 30th day of September, 1990. 
Respectfully 
VTRGIXW CURTIS LEE 
Attorney on Appeal for Appellee 
The Royal Order of the Sun 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Hand delivered a trueop.nd correct copy of the foregoing 
document tnis day of KJX-LSrV/JJ^\ . 1990, to: 
Kathryn S. Denholm 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
263 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Shawn E. Draney 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Studebaker's 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
25 
w wno is a Known interdicted person, 
and by those actions causes the intoxication of that person, is liable for inju-
ries in person, property, or means of support to any third person, or to the 
spouse, child, or parent of that third person, resulting from the intoxication. 
An employer is liable for the actions of its employees in violation of this 
chapter. 
(2) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1) has a cause of 
action against the person who provided the liquor or other alcoholic beverage 
in violation of Subsection (1). 
(3) If a person having rights or liabilities under this chapter dies, the rights 
or liabilities provided by this chapter survive to or against that person's es-
tate. 
(4) The total amount of damages that may be awarded to any person pursu-
ant to a cause of action under this chapter which arises after the effective date 
of this subsection is limited to $100,000 and the aggregate amount which may 
be awarded to all persons injured as a result of one occurrence is limited to 
$300,000. 
(5) An action based upon a cause of action under this chapter which arises 
after the effective date of this subsection shall be commenced within two years 
after the date of the injury. 
(6) Nothing in this chapter precludes any cause of action or additional 
recovery against the person causing the injury. 
(7) (a) A sanction or termination of employment may not be imposed upon 
any employee of any restaurant, club, or any other facility serving alco-
holic beverages as a result of the employee having exercised the em-
ployee's independent judgment to refuse to sell alcoholic beverages to any 
person the employee considers to meet one or more of the conditions 
described in Subsection (1). 
(b) Any employer who terminates an employee or imposes sanctions on 
the employee contrary to this section is considered to have discriminated 
against that employee and is subject to the conditions and penalties set 
forth in Chapter 35, Title 34, the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act. 
History: C. 1953, 32A-14-1, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1986, ch. 177, § 3; 1989, ment, effective April 24, 1989, added Subsec-
ch. 240, § 1. tion (7) and made minor stylistic changes. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AJLR. — Intoxicating liquors: employer's li- third parties as a result of intoxicated guest's 
ability for furnishing or permitting liquor on negligence, 62 A.L.R.4th 16. 
social occasion, 51 A.L.R.4th 1048. Passenger's liability to vehicular accident 
Social host's liability for injuries incurred by victim for harm caused by intoxicated motor 
vehicle driver, 64 A.L.R4th 272. 
32A-14-2. Immunity of state, state agencies and em-
ployees, and political subdivisions. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Section 
32A-13-2. Arrests. 
32A-13-2. Arrests [Effective July 1, 1990]. 
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, all arrests of persons for any 
violation of this title are in accordance with Chapter 7, Title 77, Utah Code of 
Criminal Procedure, and Rules 6 and 7, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
All summons in lieu of warrants of arrest are in accordance with Rule 6, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
History: C. 1953, 32A-13-2, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 1. 
Amended effective July 1, 1990. — Laws 
1989, ch. 187, § 1 amends this section effective 
July 1, 1990. See amendment note below. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective July 1,1990, substituted refer-
ences to the Rules of Criminal Procedure for 
references to Chapter 35 of Title 77. 
CHAPTER 14 
DRAMSHOP LIABILITY 
Section 
32A-14-1. Liability for injuries resulting from 
illegal sale or other distribution of 
alcoholic beverages — Injured per-
son's cause of action against per-
sons who provided alcoholic bever-
age — Survival of action — Limi-
tation on damages — Statute of 
limitations — Employee may not 
be disciplined or fired for refusing 
to serve alcoholic beverage to 
minor or intoxicated or interdicted 
person. 
32A-14-1. Liability for injuries resulting from illegal sale 
or other distribution of alcoholic beverages — In-
jured person's cause of action against persons 
who provided alcoholic beverage — Survival of 
action — Limitation on damages — Statute of lim-
itations — Employee may not be disciplined or 
fired for refusing to serve alcoholic beverage to 
minor or intoxicated or interdicted person. 
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or at a 
location allowing consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage, to a 
person: 
(a) who is under the age of 21 years, or 
(b) who is apparently under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic bev-
erages or products or drugs, or 
(c) whom the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage knew or should 
have known from the circumstances was under the influence of intoxicat-
